Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in scapy - #VU159468
Published: November 5, 2026
Vulnerability details
The vulnerability allows a remote TLS 1.3 client to complete a client-authenticated handshake with Scapy's TLSServerAutomaton and send application data without proving possession of the presented certificate's private key. If a caller treats the stored client certificate as a verified identity, attacker-supplied traffic can consequently be associated with someone else's certificate.
The vulnerability exists due to failure to enforce the CertificateVerify signature verification result. The certificate parser stores the peer-controlled certificate chain in the session, and the proof parser verifies the signature against the first certificate, but an invalid result is only logged at INFO level; it is neither retained nor used to stop the handshake. The server automaton then consumes the message through an empty handler, accepts Finished, and proceeds to application data. A remote attacker can connect to a program using TLSServerAutomaton with client_auth=True, initiate a TLS 1.3 handshake, present a non-empty certificate, and sign CertificateVerify with an unrelated attacker-controlled private key. The demonstrated invalid proof uses RSA-PSS/SHA-256 and does not require disclosure of the server's private key.
CertificateVerify is intended to prove ownership of the certificate's private key by signing the handshake transcript. Finished proves possession of the negotiated traffic secret instead, so accepting it does not compensate for the unenforced signature check. The presented certificates remain in cur_session.client_certs despite the failed proof. This is a client-certificate proof-of-possession failure, not a blanket authorization bypass in a shipped Scapy web server: no in-tree consumer makes authorization decisions from that session state, and HTTPS_Server uses Python's ssl implementation rather than this automaton.