Improper Authentication in scapy - #VU159471
Published: November 5, 2026
Vulnerability details
The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated endpoint to bypass authentication and gain access to a protected network when a network access server (NAS) uses Scapy's RADIUS answering machine as its authentication server. The daemon returns a cryptographically valid Access-Accept without checking the endpoint's password, certificate, or other credential, causing the NAS to treat the exchange as successful authentication.
The vulnerability exists due to Radius_am.make_reply() initializing responses as Access-Accept and retaining that success code when authentication raises a Scapy_Exception. Unsupported EAP and CHAP, a missing authentication method, or missing authentication inputs can reach this error path, where the exception handler only logs a warning. Execution then computes the Response Authenticator and Message-Authenticator using the configured shared secret, making the erroneous acceptance authoritative to the NAS. A remote attacker can send a normal EAP identity response through a NAS configured to use this daemon and receive network access without authenticating.
The affected component is Radius_am, exposed as radiusd() in scapy/layers/radius.py. Exploitation requires an application to start the daemon with its shared secret and IDENTITIES configuration and a NAS to use it as its RADIUS server; the NAS forwards Access-Requests to UDP port 1812 by default. Although intended for lab and setup use rather than as a full RADIUS implementation, the daemon signs authentication decisions with the NAS shared secret. Supported PAP and MS-CHAPv2 authentication failures explicitly produce Access-Reject responses, unlike the exception path.