Improper access control in scapy - #VU159472
Published: November 5, 2026
Vulnerability details
The vulnerability allows a remote requester to obtain name-resolution answers from Scapy's LLMNR responder outside the protocol's intended local-link boundary. When relay mode is enabled, names without a local match are resolved through the responder host's configured DNS servers, exposing answers from that host's DNS view. Disclosure of internal-only records depends on the resolver used by the host; the advisory demonstrates retrieval of a public DNS answer, not an internal-only record.
The vulnerability exists due to the shared DNS request gate checking only the query bit and an optional source allowlist, without validating the destination address or hop limit. The from_ip setting defaults to True, accepting every IPv4 source. A remote attacker can send a unicast UDP query to port 5355 on a reachable host running the LLMNR answering machine and receive a response despite the query not arriving through link-local multicast. Queries are also accepted regardless of how many hops they crossed; the demonstrated unicast query uses a hop limit of 42. With relay mode enabled, accepted requests without a local match invoke dns_resolve(), and the resulting DNS answer is copied into the response.
The affected responder, LLMNR_am, inherits the common DNS responder implemented in scapy/layers/dns.py and is defined in scapy/layers/llmnr.py. An application must explicitly start llmnrd() on an interface; ordinary Scapy packet dissection does not start a responder. LLMNR queries are intended for the link-local multicast destinations 224.0.0.252 or ff02::1:3 with a hop limit of 1, and RFC 4795 requires responders to discard unicast UDP queries. This restriction is specific to LLMNR: mDNS permits direct unicast queries.