Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Etherpad - #VU159510
Published: November 5, 2026
Vulnerability details
The vulnerability allows a privileged Etherpad HTTP API caller to bypass the force=false destination-overwrite guard and persistently corrupt another pad's internal revision or chat records. Corrupted revision history can break the time-slider, historical export, getRevisionChangeset, and pad.check(), partially denying access to history features while leaving the pad's current head text intact. This makes the corruption silent and does not expose pad contents.
The vulnerability exists due to improper validation of pad identifiers and inconsistent sanitization of API parameters. The pad identifier validator permits the ueberdb namespace delimiter :, and the copy/move API family does not sanitize destinationID, unlike padID and padName. A remote attacker can use a global API key or OAuth-admin token to submit a destination such as victim:revs:0 to copyPad, movePad, or copyPadWithoutHistory. The destination-existence check requires a top-level atext field, but revision records store that field under meta, so an existing revision record is incorrectly treated as a nonexistent destination. The overwrite guard therefore permits the operation even with force=false, allowing a source head object to overwrite the victim's revision record without valid changeset or metadata fields.
Etherpad stores pad heads under pad:<padId>, revisions under pad:<padId>:revs:<n>, and chat entries under pad:<padId>:chat:<n>; delimiter-bearing destinations collide with these internal namespaces. movePad also deletes the source pad, while copyPadWithoutHistory shares the unsanitized destination parameter. Ordinary end-user entry points sanitize the delimiter, so exploitation requires privileged API access rather than unauthenticated or low-privilege access. API administrators already have authority to modify or delete pads; the defect instead violates the documented overwrite-safety contract and can affect integrations that forward user-controlled destination values through privileged API calls.